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MATHEMATICAL VS EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENT
DAVIDE BONDONI
Abstract. In this short paper I will put in evidence a problem nested in
Ozawa’s effort to block von Neumann’s chains and in his attributing the wave-
collapse to a interaction between systems. This suggests distinguishing sharply
the mathematical world from the phenomenological one.
1. von Neumann
Let us starting with Ozawa’s own words:
The orthodox view [of the wave-collapse] confuses the time at which
the outcome of measurement is obtained and the time at which
the object is left in the state determined by the outcome. (. . . ) it
confuses the time just after the reading of the outcome and the time
just after the interaction between the object and the apparatus.
There is no causality relation between the outcome and the state
just after measurement (. . . ).1
I agree with Ozawa on this point. Otherwise, we would have a regress at infinity, a
sort of hegelian odd infinity as von Neumann points out:
(. . . ) wir müssen die Welt immer in zwei Teile teilen, der eine ist
das beobachtete System, der andere der Beobachter. (. . . ) Daß
diese Grenze [i.e. zwischen beide Systeme] beliebig tief ins Innere
des Körpers des wirchlichen Beobachters verschoben kann, ist der
Inhalt des Prinzips vom psychophysikalischen Parallelismus (. . . )2
[(...) we must always divide the world in two parts, the
one being the observed system, the other the observer. (...)
That this boundary [i.e. between the observed system and
the observer] can be pushed at will deeply in the interior
of the body of the real observer is the content of the principle
of the psycho-physical parallelism (...)]3
Surely the word beliebig [at will] is the source of such problem. This way, the
counsciousness can enter in the description of a measurement. On the other hand,
we must distinguish the measurement and the reading of this measurement; i.e. the
entanglement of the object with the observer and the reading of this interaction by
the experimenter. So, we can no longer assert that the mind causes the collapse,
as the given collapse is occurred earlier.
As the japanese physician accurately demonstrates, the wave-collapse occurs in a
Date: June 2 2010.
1[Oza03, p. 117].
2[vN32, pp. 223–224]. The italic is mine.
3[WZ83, p. 622]. The italic is mine. I corrected the original translation in two points.
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time interval t+∆t, while the perception of this collapse is at t+∆t+ τ , interval
in which the two systems (object and observer) can no longer be in a relation.
On the other hand, we can observe that exists only that is perceivable in a phe-
nomenon. A mesureament which is not perceived (by a reading) is not a real
measurement. It is a logically possible interaction which doesn’t belong to the
reality. From the discrasy between the above mentioned intervals4 Ozawa infers
a difference between measurement and perceiving of this measurement. But it is
a logical inference. How can someone experience a measurement without inter-
act with it (with a reading)?5 And if this collapse is not experienceable, then we
are making meta-physics (we are going beyond physics). Therefore, is not usefull
putting aside a non physical entity as the mind to leave room for something more
abstract, as a measurement without reading, also if this something has a definite
grade of mathematical reality.
Moreover, Masanao Ozawa doesn’t answer the main question. The reading of a
measurement is invoked to explain the collapse; now, if this cannot be more the
cause of the collapse, what is the real cause? Apparently, the interaction between
subject and object, but we have no direct experience of it. I prefer a mereological-
nominalistic stance (à la Leśniewski) in which it is a perceived measurement in a
given context to determinate the wave-collapse. Von Neumann seems adhering to
this position, stating:
(. . . ) die Erfahrung macht nur Aussagen von diesem Typus: ein
Beobachter hat eine bestimmte (subjective)Wahrnehmung gemacht,
und nie eine solche: eine physikalische Größe hat ein bestimmten
Wert.6
[(...) experience only permits statements of this type:
an observer has made a certain (subjective) observation;
and never any like this: a physical quantity has a certain
value.]7
Obviously it is higly questionable the subjective character of our perception. Our
perception is on the contrary objective in a phenomenological point of view. What
is more objective than the fact that we have in front of us a given and no other
4We cannot eliminate τ from the interval t + ∆t + τ putting it as 0, because as you shows,
∆t < τ [Oza03, p. 116].
5One can interacts with an object without knowing the result of this interaction. For example,
an observer can know that he is interacting with an object, without knowing the eigen-state in
which the object jumped. The observer knows that surely by this interaction the system-object
jumped in an eigen-state |φi〉 and that an observable O must have in |φi〉 an eigen-value λi. But the
observer cannot, without a reading, know in which eigen-state the system is. Obviously, knowing
the wave-function of the system, he knows too the amplitudes of the probabilities associated to
its vectors, but this is only a mathematical (statistic) forecasting, not a perception. In this sense,
the fact that at t +∆t the system-object is in an eigen-state is only an inference.
6[vN32, p. 224].
7[WZ83, p. 622]. I substitued experience only makes statements. . . with experience only permits
statements. . . inasmuch it is evident from the discourse that any statement which don’t satisfy
certain conditions is not permitted. In other words, a purely objective observation is impossible for
von Neumann. It is against the real physical experience making objective (if possible) statements.
It is an absurdity.
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experimental set-up, built in a given way, with given pointers?
Using Bohr’s own words:
(. . . ) in actual experiments all evidence pertains to observations
obtained under reproducible conditions and is expressed by un-
ambiguous statements referring to the registration of the point at
which an atomic particle arrive on a photographic plate (. . . ).8
And:
(. . . ) the problem of explanation that is embodied in the notion of
complementarity suggests itself in our position as conscious beings
and recalls forcefully the teaching of ancient thinkers that, in the
search for a harmonious attitute towards life, it must never be
forgotten that we ourselves are both actors and spectators in the
drama of existence.9
Obviously, it is one thing asserting that reality must be confined to the realm
of experience and one other asserting that the cause of the wave-collapse, which
oughts to belong to our experience, must coincide with the act of registration of a
measure. Ozawa successfully shows that this act cannot cause the collapse. But,
where is, then, the real cause of this collapse? If this is the measurement, where is,
ontologically speaking, this measurement?
Let us quote Max Planck:
(. . . ) es ist unmöglich (. . . ) daß die ganze bisherige Entwicklung
der physikalischen Erkenntnis tatsächlich gerade auf eine möglichst
weitgehende grundsäztliche Trennung der Vorgänge in der äußeren
Natur von der Vorgängen in der menschlichen Empfindungswelt
hinarbeitet.10
[(...) it is impossible (...) that the development of the
knowledge in Physics until now aimed at a fundamental and
radical division between the processes in the external nature
and the processes in the human world of feelings.]11
Being no clear distinction between subject and object, it is best adopting an holistic
view and consider as fundamental the perceived phenomenon. I.e. there are not in
reality subject and object as two clear distinct entities, but a relation which founds
it. Subject and object are only in a relation, in a totally entangled Gestalt. The
measurement seen as interaction is such a Gestalt. But not meaning that observer
and object enter in relation, but that the relation founds relate and correlate.
What it is this relation in the measurement? The totality of the experimental ar-
rangement which permits speaking of measurement. A totality which lives in our
perception and is made of perceiving devices and tools of measurement. This is the
kantian position of Bohr which sees in the experiment the real cause of any result:
the a-priori, a sort of category which makes possible speaking of measurements,
particles, collapses and so on. A frame in which the observer arranges his experi-
ences.
8[Boh48, p. 317]. The italic is mine.
9[Boh48, p. 318].
10[Pla14, p. 39].
11The translations from this text are mine.
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But it is the position of Leśniewski too which saw no elements or sets, but parts
and collections. In reality, there is a body. We can imagine to split up it. If we
continue in this process at infinity, we would arrive at points or elements. But, in
reality, we stop us at an Umgebung, at a little ball not at a point.
This relation must be perceived, must be object of our perception. What could we
say of something beyond our perceptions, our Erscheinung? Planck observes:
(. . . ) was man messen kann, das existiert auch.12
[(...) what we can measure, that it exists.]
Meaning for Messung the act of measuring, the registration of measurement, not the
measurement without observer. What a measurement could be without observer, I
don’t dare to say. We can restate Planck’s quotation as follows:
(1) ∀x(M(x) → E(x))13
WithM = {x|x is measured} and E = {x|x exists}. In other words, if x is measured,
then x exists. So, if we have that ¬M(x) (i.e. x is not measured), what can we
conclude? Nothing. From ¬M(x) it follows both E(x) and ¬E(x).
2. Conclusion
Summing up, we have faced two distinct questions:
(1) the reading of a measurement cannot be the cause of the wave-collapse
(2) attributing the wave-collapse to the interaction observer-object before the
reading of the measurement stops von Neumann’s chain
According to our opinion, Ozawa successfully demonstrates 1. We are not sure that
stating 1 rules out completely the problem hidden in 2. That is, the rôle of the
subject in the act of knowing. In particular, it is not clear the phenomenological
correlate of the measurement.14 In absence of a precise phenomenological correlate
of a measurement, we can infer that this process amounts to an observation without
observer.
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